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Appellant's Response to Government's Statement of Facts 
The State correctly noted that Lamb engaged in the preliminary planning of an 
escape from the county jail where he was housed during the pre-trial phase of the case at 
bar. (Resp. Br. at 1 6). However, the State failed to note the very important point that 
Lamb voluntarily abandoned the plan prior to its commencement. (PSR, "Supplemental 
Report", ps. 4). Not only did Lamb abandon the plan, he took additional steps to 
remedy the situation by returning the shower head. Id. Based thereon, and based on 
Lamb's lack of a prior record otherwise, Lamb disagrees with the Government's position 
that Lamb would not do well on community supervision or retained jurisdiction (Resp. 
Br. at 6), and that this supports an excessive sentence of fifteen to twenty-five years. 
II. 
Appellant's Responses to Government's Arguments Regarding the District 
Court's Abuse of Discretion 
A. Psychological Evaluation 
The government argues that the District Court acted within its sentencing 
discretion in part by claiming that Lamb's "risk to re-off end" would be higher butfhr his 
low scores on a particular sexual risk evaluation. (Resp. Br. at 8). In other words, he 
would have scored higher, or be seen as a higher risk to re-offend, if he had scored higher 
on the testing tools. However, the fact of the matter is Lamb did not score higher. 
Therefore, the "lower risk to re-offend" finding was based on fact rather than speculation. 
The government's argument is akin to saying that ifwe do not consider all the sentencing 
factors, then we would reach a different result. This of course produces an absurd 
conclusion by ignoring the facts contained in the record. Due to the speculative nature of 
4 
this argument in favor of upholding Lamb's sentence in the interests of protection of 
society, the State's reliance thereon is misplaced. 
B. Sentencing Factors 
The State argues that the District Court in this case referenced and discussed all of 
the sentencing factors. (Resp. Br. at 5). While Lamb concedes that the District Court 
may have considered several factors at the sentencing hearing, he respectfully notes that 
the District Court failed to properly consider mental health factors, via a psychological 
evaluation, even though the Court specifically recognized the existence of psychological 
issues. (See Tr., p. 55, ls. 3-10). This omission is exacerbated by the fact that the District 
Court is mandated to order a psychological evaluation, to allow it to consider additional 
important and relevant sentencing infornrntion, under Idaho law. See Idaho Code § 19-
2522(1), (3). 
Therefore, the District Court in this case failed to consider all the relevant 
sentencing factors. Lamb respectfully disagrees with the State on this point 
Additionally, the State argued that "[w]hile Lamb does not have a significant 
prior criminal history, he did demonstrate his willingness to engage in additional criminal 
activity after his arrest in the present case." (Resp. Br. at 6). Lamb notes that the State is 
either misstating or understating the very important factor of Lamb's prior record ( or lack 
thereof). In fact, Lamb has no prior criminal history other than a fishing ticket. (PSR, p. 
4). Additionally, as noted herein above, Lamb's "additional criminal activity" involved 
participating in a scheme which he voluntarily abandoned, which was never carried out, 
and which he took affirmative steps to remedy. (See Section I, supra; PSR, Suppl. Rep., 
p. 2, 4). 
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III. 
Appellant's Responses To Government's Arguments Regarding 
The District Court's Failure To Order a Psychological Evaluation 
A. Invited Error Doctrine 
The State argues that the Invited Error Doctrine precludes Lamb from pursuing 
his appellate issue concerning the lack of a psychological evaluation. (Resp. Br. at 9-10). 
The State is correct in stating that Lamb's counsel failed to request a separate 
psychological evaluation prior to sentencing. (Id at 10). However, Lamb asserts that 
this doctrine does not apply in this case because Lamb did not decline a psychological 
evaluation or refuse to participate in one. Rather, his counsel made an inappropriate 
statement to the District Court regarding the difference between types of evaluations. 
However, statements of counsel are not evidence. See Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 
202; see also United Slates v. Castillo-Basa, 478 F.3d 1025, 1034 (9th Cir. 
2007)("[d]efense counsel's closing argument ... was not itself evidence on which the jury 
could have based its decision"). Therefore, the erroneous statement of counsel cannot be 
relied upon to invoke the Invited Error Doctrine. Further, to do so would violate the clear 
direction of Idaho law as set forth in LC. § 19-2522, which sets forth a duty for district 
courts to order a psychological evaluation if the person's mental health may become a 
significant factor at sentencing. 
The State's argument on this issue also fails to recognize an important exception 
to the Invited Error Doctrine, which applies in this case. In State v. Leyva, 117 Idaho 462 
(Ct. App. 1990), the Court of Appeals held that "relief [from the Invited Error doctrine] 
might be appropriate if defense counsel heedlessly disregarded his client's legitimate 
interests, or otherwise provided ineffective assistance, in a sentencing proceeding." Id at 
465. In this case, Lamb asserts that his counsel did in fact "heedlessly disregard" Lamb's 
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interests in a fair and complete sentencing by failing to pursue a psychological 
evaluation. Assuming Lamb's counsel in the district court thoroughly reviewed the 
psychosexual evaluation and the PreSentence Report, counsel would have or should have 
been fully aware of Lamb's mental health issues and psychological difficulties. (See, 
generally, PSR, attachment 1, p. 1; attachment 2, p. 6 ( diagnosing Lamb with mental 
health issues, including Mood Disorder and "personality disorder with schizotypal 
features''); PSR, attachment 1, p. 5 (indicating that Lamb's symptoms were "consistent 
with a diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder")). Counsel should have pursued the 
additional evaluation, to ensure that his client was being sentenced on complete and 
accurate information, and to ensure that any potential mitigating information was being 
pursued and presented to the district court. In failing to do so, counsel did indeed 
"heedlessly disregard Lamb's legitimate interests", and ineffectively assisted Lamb at the 
sentencing phase. Lamb should be entitled to relief based thereon. 
B. Failure To Presenre Issue 
The State argues that this Court should ignore Lamb's appeal because Lamb 
failed to properly preserve the issue in the trial court. (Resp. Br. at 10). This argument 
fails on two separate grounds. 
First, the authority which the Government bases its objection is strictly limited, by 
its own plain language, to errors at jury trial. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 
(2010). Lamb's appellate issue was comprised of an error committed by the District 
Court at the sentencing phase. Further, the error was based in statutory authority, lending 
further support to the fundamental nature of the error. 
7 
Second, as the State conceded in its o\Vn brief, the Idaho Court of Appeals has 
already rejected this argument, in State v. Clinton, 2012 Opinion No. 43, Docket No. 
38755 (Ct. App. 2012), petition for review granted November 7, 2012. In Clinton, the 
defendant argued that the district court erred in failing to sua sponte order a 
psychological evaluation at sentencing, and imposed an excessive sentence. The State 
countered that the failure to request the evaluation prior to sentencing, and the failure to 
object to the lack of the evaluation prior to sentencing, precluded the appellate courts 
from considering the issue. They based their argument on the ''fundamental error" 
standard set forth in the Perry case. Perry, supra, 150 Idaho at 224, 226. The Perry 
Court set forth a uniform standard for analyzing "unobjected to" errors. 
However, the Clinton Court rejected the State's argument that the Per,y 
fundamental error analysis applied to a defendant's failure to object to a district Court's 
decision not to order a psychological evaluation for sentencing purposes. The Court 
determined that "the nature of the fundamental error standard, as articulated by our 
Supreme Court, focuses on the impairment of a right to a defendant that is so important 
that appellate review should not be denied, despite the defendant's failure to preserve the 
issue for appeal." Clinton, supra, at 5. 
The Clinton Court noted that [daho Code §19-2522 was intended to "ensure well-
informed sentencing decisions for the benefit and protection of society, as well as the 
defendant." Id. They noted that district courts need "sufficient psychological 
information before sentencing a defendant, not just for the defendant's sake, but also in 
order to determine what is best for society." Id. (citing State v. Durham, 146 Idaho 364, 
369-70 (Ct. App. 2008)). The Clinton Court concluded by stating that 
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"Given the considerations we discuss above, we are not 
convinced that Perry's fundamental error standard is the proper 
standard to be applied in this context; nor can we comfortably 
say that a defendant's failure to request a psychological 
evaluation should be allowed to prevent review on direct appeal, 
which would be the essential result of applying the fundamental 
error standard." Id at 6. 
Based thereon, the State's argument on this ground clearly fails. Lamb should be 
allowed to pursue this issue on appeal. 
C. Necessity of Evaluation 
The Government correctly concedes that the District Court should have ordered a 
psychological evaluation if it appeared that Lamb's mental condition was a significant 
factor at sentencing. (See Idaho Code § 19-2522(1 )). However, the Government goes on 
to argue that Lamb's mental condition was not a significant factor because it was not a 
key underlying factor in the commission of the crime itself. The Government cites State 
v. Schultz, 149 Idaho 285 (Ct. App. 2010), in support of the legal argument. However, 
the actual clear and unequivocal language of the Schultz opinion notes that this is not an 
exclusive factor in the determination at issue, but rather one of presumably many factors 
to examine. Therefore, the Government's reliance thereon is misplaced. 
The State argues that a psychological evaluation was not necessary because "the 
record supports a finding that there was no reason to believe Lamb's mental condition 
would be a significant factor at sentencing .... " (Resp. Br. at 13). This argument is 
offset by evidence in the record that Lamb did have psychological issues. For example, 
two separate attachments to the PreSentence Report contained information or specific 
diagnoses of mental health problems and issues. The GAIN-I Assessment (PSR, 
Attachment l) includes a DSM-IV/ICD-9 diagnosis of Mood Disorder and notes 
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symptoms "consistent with a diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder." (PSR, Attachment 
1, pp. 1, 5). The PsychoSexual Evaluation completed by Mountain State Counseling and 
Psychological Services (PSR, Attachment 2) contained an actual diagnosis of 
"Personality Disorder" with "Antisocial and Schizotypal Traits". (PSR, Attachment 2, p. 
6). The PSE also noted the existence of "numerous psychiatric issues" with Mr. Lamb. 
(Id at p. 15). 
Additionally, the State seems to attempt to bolster their argument against the 
necessity of an evaluation by apparently relying on Lamb's diagnosis of himself (See 
Resp. Br. at 14). This argument must fail for a number of reasons, not the least of which 
would include his obvious lack of foundation to diagnose mental health issues, his lack of 
medical education, his lack of education in general, and the general inability of any 
person suffering from mental health issues to recognize and seek help for his problems. 
The State further argues that the District Court's notation of Lamb's mental health 
issues does not compel the Court to order a psychological evaluation. (Resp. Br. at 14-
15). The State cites no authority in support of this legal argument, and therefore it should 
be disregarded by this Court. However, going a step further, the State's argument seems 
to directly contradict the clear dictate of Idaho law as set forth in § 19-2522. Section 19-
2522 mandates that the sentencing court order an evaluation under these circumstances. 
Next, the State argues that the sentencing court "had ample evidence regarding 
[Lamb's] mental condition ... " to satisfy the dictates of LC. §19-2522. (Resp. Br. at 15). 
However, in doing so, the State engages in a disingenuous analysis, trying to "have it 
both ways". On the one hand, the Government is arguing that a psychological evaluation 
is not necessary because there was no evidence of mental health issues, other than what 
was presented in the psychosexual evaluation (in other words, that the PSE should not be 
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relied upon). On the other hand, the Government is arguing that the psychosexual 
evaluation offered plenty of information for the District Court to rely upon, obviating the 
need for a separate psychological evaluation. These clearly competing arguments cannot 
support the Government's opposition to Lamb's appellate issue. 
Finally, Lamb takes exception to the State's apparent misstatement of the 
evidence in its brief. The Government argues that "Lamb's wishes" did not include a 
psychological evaluation. (See Resp. Br. at p. 11 (title), p. 16). This appears to misstate 
the evidence, in that Lamb never indicated a wish not to undergo a psychological 
evaluation. Neither Lamb nor his counsel ever declined to participate in a psychological 
evaluation. Rather, Lamb was never given the opportunity to undergo the evaluation, 
despite clear evidence of mental health issues in the materials before the Court, and 
despite his counsel's apparent heedless disregard of Lamb's legitimate interest in having 
potentially mitigating information provided on Lamb's behalf at his sentencing hearing 
where he was facing life in prison. See Leyva, 117 Idaho at 465. 
D. Insufficiency of Information in the Record 
As noted by the Government in its brief, the record did contain some information 
regarding Mr. Lamb's mental health condition. (See, e.g., Section Ill(c), supra). Mr. 
Lamb concedes this fact, and concedes that the District Court likely reviewed what 
information was available. However, Lamb argues that the information available was 
insufficient to assist the District Court in reaching the proper sentencing result, both for 
the Defendant, Mr. Lamb, and for the best interest of society. (See Clinton, supra, at p. 
5)(holding that " ... section 19-2522 was enacted to, and operates to, ensure well-
informed sentencing decisions for the benefit and protection of society, as well as the 
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defendant."). This failure resulted in the District Court acting in "manifest disregard" of 
the sentencing requirements of Idaho Criminal Rule 32. The GAIN Assessment and the 
psychosexual evaluation provided helpful information regarding Mr. Lamb's mental 
health issues and psychological problems. They certainly supported the notion that Mr. 
Lamb's mental condition should be an important and significant factor at sentencing. 
(See Idaho Code §19-2522(1)). However, neither of these documents qualified as a 
psychological or mental health evaluation. Indeed, neither was designed for such a 
purpose. While the District Court could have reviewed, and likely did review, these 
documents, the fact remains that these documents indicated a further and additional need 
for mental health evaluation and diagnosis. Pursuant to the clear dictate of Idaho law, the 
District Court erred by not ordering a psychological evaluation under these 
circumstances. (See id.). 
Based thereon, Mr. Lamb respectfully asserts that the District Court committed 
reversible error, and prays for appropriate relief from this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court abused its discretion when it imposed an excessive unified 
sentence of twenty-five years, with fifteen years fixed, upon Mr. Lamb following his plea 
of guilty to lewd conduct. The District Court committed reversible error when it failed to 
order a mental health evaluation of Mr. Lamb for consideration at sentencing. 
Notwithstanding the State's brief in opposition, Mr. Lamb respectfully requests 
that this Court grant his appeal, and grant him appropriate relief under the law. 
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